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Abstract 
An unsettled debate exists with regard to the role of intellectual property (IP) 
rights in international climate negotiation. This debate is based on premise 
that the international TRIPS Agreement set out minimum standards of 
protection, which presumably allow for unlimited extra protection. This study 
aims to address the question of whether a premise for minimum protection 
standards exists in the international IP system combined with climate-friendly 
technology transfer. First, the basic question of why international IP standards 
generate an impact on climate-friendly technology transfer is clarified. Second, 
three levels of arguments are applied to question this premise and examine 
the rationality of minimum protection standards. The three arguments are as 
follows: (1) Has TRIPS Agreement 1.1 provided unlimited minimal standards 
for IPR protection? (2) Is there no conflict between TRIPS Agreement-PLUS 
and the TRIPS Agreement? (3) How about the WTO dispute settlement panel 
report about this problem? The finding is that the dominant default policy, 
the IP protection standard, is the only minimum requirement in the case of 
uncertainty in legal provisions and practices. Therefore, the negative effects on 
the transfer of climate-friendly technology increase in terms of using flexible 
provision to promote import technologies. Third, this paper introduces China’s 
current Patent Law and its practice in response to climate-friendly technology 
transfer. Lastly, this paper provides suggestions with regard to the need for 
comprehensive and explicit protection standards in the context of climate-
friendly technology transfer.
Keywords: Climate-friendly technology. Minimum protection standards. 
International intellectual property rights. Developing countries. China. TRIPS 
Agreement. TRIPS-PLUS. DSB. Ceiling.
1 Introduction
Climate-friendly technology requires high input and involves high risk and 
thus entails the establishment of a mechanism that encourages technological 
innovation and transfer. The patent system for climate-friendly technology is 
precisely built to realize this purpose. The patent system for climate-friendly 
technology aims to create, promote, and protect climate-friendly technology and 
facilitate its application. How to improve the patent system to facilitate climate-
friendly technology innovation and transfer in the context of the depletion of 
petrochemical resources and global warming is an urgent problem. As pointed out 
by an ICTSD-EPO-UNEP report, after the Kyoto Protocol was passed in 1997, 
the number of patent applications in clean energy technology increases at an annual 
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rate of approximately 20%, which already exceeds that 
in the field of fossil fuel and nuclear energy.1 This 
phenomenon indicates that in the fight against climate 
change, IP legislation can definitely exert influence on 
climate-friendly technology innovation and transfer. 
Nonetheless, an unsettled debate exists regarding the 
role of the IP system in the development and transfer 
of climate-friendly technologies under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiation. In UNFCCC, developing 
parties contend that IPR impedes the diffusion of 
climate-friendly technologies and support evolutionary 
changes in the current international IP system to 
address climate change.2 Developed countries insist 
that IP promotes technology development and transfer 
and support an absolutely free market for climate-
friendly technology transfer. They attempt to avoid 
references to IPR under UNFCCC.3
A recent stream of studies have addressed the role 
of IP in climate-friendly technology transfer. Briefly, 
three views exist with regard to the role of IP. In most 
cases, proponents of strong IP argue that patents 
foster climate-friendly technology development and 
transfer based on basic data analysis. They insist that 
a strong IP regime can guarantee sustained motivation 
for developed countries to invest in developing 
countries (BRANSTETTER, 2006; COPENHAGEN 
ECONOMICS, 2009; HOEKMAN, 2004; 
PUGATCH, 2010). Opponents of this view argue that 
the IP regime enhances many IP holders’ paid-license 
rights but ignores the high price of the transfer. Thus, 
IP holders possess core technologies but are unwilling 
to transfer them to developing countries (ERI, 2009; 
LEWIS, 2006; MASKUS et al., 2005; WATAL, 1998). 
Other analysts observe that IP is not the only factor 
that impedes climate-friendly technology transfer 
1 nited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Economics 
and Trade Branch, European Patent Office (EPO), International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), UNEP E 
P O. ICTSD. Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap Between Evidence 
and Policy: Final Report. Geneva, 2010. Available at:
<http://www.epo.org/clean-energy>.
2 WN (Third Word Network), UNFCCC technology committee 
debates IPR issue, 2013. Available at:
<http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/
climate130705.htm>.
3 CIED (The Coalition for Innovation, Employment and 
Development), Joint Resolution of  BUSINESSEUROPE, IIPPF 
and the Global Intellectual Property Center on Climate Change, 
Technology, and Intellectual Property Rights, 2009. Available at:
< h t t p : / / w w w . t h e c i e d . o r g / f i l e s / 2 0 1 0 / 1 0 /
FinalJointGreenTechnologiesClimateChangeStatementSept2809.pdf>.
(BARTON, 2007; OCKWELL, 2007; UNEP-
EPO-ICTSD, 2010). Although IP is a real challenge 
in climate-friendly technology transfer, it has not 
been formally recognized by UNFCCC despite the 
controversy. However, no firm evidence exists on how 
IP affects the diffusion of climate technologies. These 
studies show that IP is closely related to climate-friendly 
technology transfer and offers empirical analyses to 
clarify the role of IP in climate-friendly technology 
transfer. Nevertheless, literature has provided no 
coherent conclusion with regard to the effect of IP 
on climate-friendly technology because national 
policies make it difficult to determine the role of IP. 
Moreover, a few studies have explored the reason a 
controversy continues to exist between IP and climate-
friendly technology transfer from the perspective of 
international laws.
Generally, in the field of international IP legislation, 
the IP system is believed to have been established 
based on minimum protection standards; no upper 
limit was set. This lack of upper limit serves as a 
legitimate basis for raising the standards of IP in 
signing bilateral or regional trade agreements and 
profoundly affects the judgment of the dispute 
settlement body (DSB). However, excessively high IP 
standards nullify the flexible clauses on the promotion 
of public interests set in the international IP system. 
With regard to actions that tackle climate change, 
developing countries propose refining such flexible 
clauses for climate-friendly technologies to become 
more easily transferrable. Numerous proposals have 
been introduced to the current international climate 
negotiation on technology to improve or establish a new 
international IP system that accommodates the transfer 
of climate-friendly technologies based on flexible 
clauses.4 Meanwhile, in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) forum, the Doha Ministerial Conference 
agreed to establish a working group to examine the 
relationship between trade and technology transfer 
and possible recommendations for steps that may be 
implemented within the WTO mandate to increase 
the flows of technology to developing countries. 
The WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
4 In Cancun climate negotiation, Bolivia, which is one of  the 
strongest opponents of  the injustices derived from the TRIPS 
Agreement, insisted on weakening the IP system as a prerequisite 
to any climate deal. India issued a proposal for the inclusion of  
supplementary agenda items in the provisional agenda of  COP 17, 
including IP-related items, such as the treatment and delivery of  
climate technologies and their IPRs as a public good.
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Property (TRIPS Agreement) Council, in its first 
meeting for 2014, discussed the topic “Contribution 
of intellectual property (IP) to facilitate the transfer of 
environmentally rational technology.” However, so far, 
limited advancement toward tackling climate change 
has been achieved. International efforts to promote 
climate-friendly technology innovation and transfer 
have not been able to transform into integrated forces 
because of the unresolved controversy between IP and 
technology transfer.
From the perspective of international laws, the 
essence of IP debates mainly arises from the conflicting 
opinions of all parties with respect to the relationship 
between IP level and IP protection standards. 
Developed countries contend that enhancing IP will 
facilitate technology innovation and transfer. Hence, 
current standards should specify only the minimum 
requirements and not the ceiling. By contrast, developing 
countries argue that enhancing IP does not necessarily 
facilitate technology innovation and transfer. Thus, 
existing protection standards should incorporate both 
the minimum and maximum requirements. Obviously, 
international IP agreements under the framework of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
and the TRIPS Agreement under WTO were set up 
based on the hypothesis that only minimum protection 
standards exist in the international IP system.5 Hitherto, 
TRIPS Agreement-Plus as an additional protection 
standard has been introduced in bilateral and regional 
trade agreements that involve or are dominated by 
developed countries. Such requirement imposes further 
restriction on the applicable range of the flexible 
clauses of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, developing 
countries are likely to face a legislation challenge in 
terms of facilitating the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies by taking advantage of the flexible clauses 
of the TRIPS Agreement.
As a major emitter of CO2, China has a strong 
demand for climate-friendly technology. China is also 
facing issues such as deficiency in independent research 
and development of climate-friendly technology and 
serious defects in climate-friendly technology patent 
transfer. Many reasons cause these problems. Such 
reasons include inadequate investment in research and 
development, inadequate infrastructures, and weak 
green patent consciousness. However, China must still 
5 RUSE-KHAN, H. G. Time for a paradigm shift: exploring 
maximum standards in international intellectual property protection, 
1. Trade L. & Dev. 56, 2009.
follow the above inherent assumptions (“minimum 
protection standards”) as the starting point in 
establishing patent laws. These assumptions might 
urge the nation to increase IP protection standards 
while providing minimal emphasis on self-national 
conditions.
With these issues in mind, this paper focuses 
on several questions. First, why do international IP 
protection standards generate an impact on climate-
friendly technology transfer? Second, is it true that 
only minimum protection standards are established 
by the existing international IP system? Third, what 
is the impact of minimum protection standards on 
China’s climate-friendly technology patent legislation 
practices? Lastly, this paper provides two levels of 
alternative suggestions for perfecting IP legislation to 
enhance climate-friendly technology innovation and 
transfer.
2 Transfer of climate-friendly technologies and 
minimum protection standards for IP
A. Definition of climate-friendly technologies
The reform, transfer, and application of climate-
friendly technology are the premises to realize the 
ultimate goal of climate change response described in 
Article 2 of UNFCCC. Article 2 of UNFCCC states 
the following:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any 
related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, 
to ensure that food production is not threatened and 
to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.
Climate-friendly technologies, including solar 
photovoltaic and wind power generation technologies, 
are also known as environmentally sound, clean energy, 
and new energy technologies. The improvement of 
energy utilization efficiency and the development of 
climate-friendly technology create a bright prospect 
of CO2 emission reduction. These technologies can 
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effectively lower the consumption of materials and 
energy and mitigate the negative impact on the 
environment. The important document Agenda 21 
issued by United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 1992 provides a clear definition of 
climate-friendly technology; its Article 34.1 states that
Environmentally sound technologies protect the 
environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a 
more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes 
and products, and handle residual wastes in a more 
acceptable manner than the technologies for which 
they were substitutes.
Article 4.5 of UNFCCC further specifies the 
obligation of developed countries that sign the contract 
in transferring technology to developing countries.
The developed country Parties and other developed 
Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, to enable them 
to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this 
process, the developed country Parties shall support 
the development and enhancement of endogenous 
capacities and technologies of the developing country 
Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a position 
to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of 
such technologies.
However, no formal legal document that provides 
an explicit definition of climate-friendly technology 
and its transfer exists. The primary reasons for this 
condition include scientific uncertainty and rivalry 
in political views. Although an explicit, unified legal 
concept accepted by different countries is important to 
solve relevant problems, the absence of such concept 
does not mean that no international actions are possible 
before this concept is established. Scientific uncertainty 
and clash of interests make policies and regulations 
with significance to environmental risk control and 
sustainable development highly necessary.6 Post-event 
remedy is often too late considering the irreversibility 
of climate change. Article 3.3 in UNFCCC states that
The Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there 
6 GILROY, J. M. Justice and nature: kantian philosophy, 
environmental policy and the law, 45. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011.
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing such measures, taking into account 
that policies and measures to deal with climate 
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, 
such policies and measures should take into account 
different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, 
cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all 
economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change 
may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.
Climate-friendly technologies have three features. 
Technically, climate-friendly technologies cannot 
be completely separated from traditional ones.7 The 
transfer of climate-friendly technologies should be 
conducted according to the legal norms applicable to 
the transfer of common manufacturing technologies. 
Currently, the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO 
framework is the major legal norm that regulates 
the transfer of international technology. In terms 
of technical purpose, climate-friendly technologies, 
which are distinctive from ordinary manufacturing 
technologies, serve the interest of the public. 
Therefore, the provisions on the transfer of climate-
friendly technologies in international trade should be 
differentiated from those on the transfer of ordinary 
technologies. The realization of the goals of addressing 
climate change should be prioritized. Most climate-
friendly technologies are high technologies, in which 
developed countries take the lead. Ownership of 
patents on climate-friendly technologies throughout 
the world indicates that developed countries have a 
dominant advantage.8 Furthermore, the statistics on 
the flow of global technologies from the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development indicate 
that most trades in climate-friendly technologies occur 
7 For example, many technologies are versatile. They not only 
belong to the traditional technical classification but also mitigate and 
adapt to climate change.
8 A study by the European Patent Office in 2011 shows that 
the top six countries in clean energy technology patents, namely, 
Japan, USA, Germany, Korea, the United Kingdom, and France, 
account for 80% of  the filings for global clean-energy technologies. 
See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Economics 
and Trade Branch, European Patent Office (EPO), International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), UNEP 
E P O. ICTSD. Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between 
evidence and policy: final report, 30. Geneva, 2010. Available at: 
<http://www.epo.Org/clean-energy.2014-2-20>.
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in developed countries.9 Therefore, the international 
IP system related to the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies must consider the interests of the 
developing countries as the major recipient of 
technologies.
B. Transfer of climate-friendly technologies and IP
The core issue of the debate in the negotiation on 
technology transfer under the framework of UNFCCC 
is whether IP impedes the transfer of climate-friendly 
technology to developing countries. The basis of the 
controversy on IP is the unclear relationship between 
IP and technology transfer. Most climate-friendly 
technologies exist in the form of patents and are actually 
transferred by IP licensing via commercial channels.10 
From the legal perspective, the relationship between IP 
and the transfer of climate-friendly technologies can be 
summarized as follows. First, IP is the object in legal 
relationships related to the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies. IP as a property right is protected by 
laws. Exchange of interests is possible by demarcating 
the boundaries between the economic interests of 
different parties. Thus, IP can be exchanged because 
of its private attribute. An international system built 
for IP renders such an exchange controllable. For this 
reason, IP is the common target considered by two 
parties in the transfer of climate-friendly technologies. 
Second, the IP system provides a static legal premise 
for the transfer of climate-friendly technologies. The 
precondition for the smooth transfer of technologies 
is an explicitly established property system. What the 
IP system provides is the recognition and protection 
of the intangible assets of the owners, which is the 
static legal premise for the trade of climate-friendly 
technologies. The IP system profoundly affects the 
entire process: from the establishment of the ownership 
of climate-friendly technologies to the transfer of IP. It 
is a “regulator” of interest balance in the transfer of 
climate-friendly technologies between transferors and 
transferees. 
C. Current situation of “Minimum Protection 
Standards” for international IP
9 HAŠČIČ, I. Climate policy and technological innovation and transfer: 
an overview of  trends and recent empirical results, 12. OECD 
Publishing, 2010.
10  WANG S-P; WANG C; XU Y-M. Intellectual property right and 
climate change, 16. Sciences Academic Press (in Chinese), 2013.
In the contemporary international system of IP 
rights, the TRIPS Agreement plays the leading role and 
has incorporated IP protection into the international 
trade system for the first time. Thus, the legal 
relationship between IP and international technology 
transfer is formally established. Whether in developed 
countries or in developing countries, the criteria for 
international IP protection are closely connected to 
the basic obligations that should be fulfilled by the 
members who sign international agreements on IP. The 
TRIPS Agreement’s preamble points out that
Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives 
of national systems for the protection of intellectual 
property, including developmental and technological 
objectives.
However, the articles of the TRIPS Agreement 
do not specify the means of promoting technology 
transfer through technology licensing. In fact, most 
of the articles of the Agreement only identify the 
goals of technology transfer to developing countries 
in an advocating manner. If no new measures are 
implemented to establish the role of IP in technology 
transfer, the IP factor will either directly or indirectly 
impede the transfer of climate-friendly technology 
from developed countries to developing countries 
in the battle against climate change. The obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement refer to the fundamental 
requirements for all WTO members as indicated by 
the minimum protection standards.11 The minimum 
standards for international IP cannot be easily 
fulfilled by developing and least-developed countries. 
These countries need to enhance the intensity of IP 
protection to fulfill international agreements. Thus, 
the minimum protection standards established by the 
international IP system represent the extension of 
rights and the high-level protection of rights. Article 
1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement generally defines only the 
minimum protection standards and not the maximum 
ones. It states that
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged 
to, implement in their law more extensive protection 
than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the 
11 TAUBMAN, A. Rethinking TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
‘Adequate remuneration’ for non-voluntary patent licensing, 927. 
Journal of  International Economic Law, J.I.E.L, 970, 2008.
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appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice.
Member states should not implement IP protection 
below the level required by the TRIPS Agreement 
but have the right to execute tighter IP protection. 
Moreover, the rules of the minimum protection 
standard are worded ambiguously. The TRIPS 
Agreement provides explicit provisions on the terms 
of protection, non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
residents, and enforcement measures but fails to define 
in detail the standard of patentability. For instance, 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement specifies that 
any invention in any field has to meet the following 
conditions to obtain a patent: novelty, usefulness, 
and originality. However, the Agreement does not 
provide the details of these three conditions. Each 
country has the right to define the denotation and 
connotation of these three conditions based on specific 
situations. Lastly, “minimum protection standards” 
increase the possibility of having abusive IP.12 In 
developed countries, enterprises that depend highly 
on IP, particularly those leading in the field of climate-
friendly technology, are being challenged by emerging 
economies. They hope that these protection criteria can 
function as the bottom line, based on which a higher 
standard for IP protection can be demanded. In this 
manner, these enterprises can maintain a competitive 
edge in technology in the long term.
In summary, the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies is regulated by the international IP system. 
Except for a few clauses that mention the concept of 
“public interest,” no explicit provisions indicating that 
“addressing climate change” is the public interest that 
deserves special considerations exist in this system. 
As a component of the one-package protocol of the 
WTO, the TRIPS Agreement applies to exceptional 
environmental terms, namely, paragraphs (b) and (g) 
of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). With regard to the issue of 
climate-friendly technology transfer, the connection 
between the TRIPS Agreement and exceptional 
environmental terms and their application ranges is 
difficult to identify. In particular, existing exceptional 
environmental terms do not directly incorporate “the 
measures for facilitating the diffusion of climate-
12  Includes high licensing fees, refusal to deal, market control, 
and the permission of  the licensor to own the majority of  the 
company’s shares.
friendly technologies in response to climate change.” 
Furthermore, minimum protection standards provide 
considerable protection for IP in developed countries 
that already have an advantage. Developed countries 
take advantage of this condition to constantly raise 
the standards of IP protection. However, developing 
countries hardly benefit from the system. Is it true that 
only minimum protection standards are established by 
the existing international IP system?
3 Reflection on “Minimum Protection Standards” in the 
international IP system
A. Is “Minimum Protection Standard” equivalent to 
“Unlimited Strong Protection”?
The minimum standard for IP protection was first 
formulated in Article 20 of the Berne Convention and 
later in Article 22 of the Rome Convention. Article 19 of 
the Paris Convention also contains similar provisions. 
The TRIPS Agreement unifies and defines “minimum 
protection standards.” The above provisions contain 
necessary restriction requirements that neither special 
protocol nor condition should not “contravene” or be 
a violation of the existing protocols (particularly at the 
end of the first sentence in Article 1.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement stating that “provided that such protection 
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”). 
Nevertheless, the clause of “minimum protection 
standard” in the TRIPS Agreement continues to create 
controversy in terms of its connotation. One point of 
view is that the heading of the first sentence of this 
clause should be emphasized, that is, the licensor has 
the right to introduce additional protection within 
the scope of the TRIPS Agreement.13 Another point 
of view is that the second sentence of this clause is 
equally important; its potential effect is to restrict the 
presence of TRIPS Agreement-Plus related to the non-
discriminatory principle of the TRIPS Agreement and 
the enforcement of IP because many clauses of the 
TRIPS Agreement imply that not only the lack of IP 
but also the abuse of IP will impede international trade. 
For example, in China – Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, part of criminal 
protection indicates that the panel holds that members 
have the right to decide on the legal system within its 
domain and the appropriate methods to implement 
13  GERVAIS, D. J. The TRIPSTRIPS Agreement: drafting history 
and analysis. 3. ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008.
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this protocol as specified by Article 1.1 in the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, the panel also holds the opinion 
that the amount of liberty granted to the members in 
this respect is only slightly considerable. The panel 
has the right to balance.14 Thus, Article 1.1 in the 
TRIPS Agreement does not allow for free discretion 
beyond the scope of minimum protection standards. 
Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement does not provide a 
complementary explanation for such uncertainty but 
reserves the discretion to the panel.
The pacta sunt servanda phrase in Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
indicates that the requirement of Article 1.1 in the 
TRIPS Agreement can be paraphrased as “the national 
law should respect the minimum standard for IP.” The 
purpose of delineating the scope of Article 1.1 in the 
TRIPS Agreement is to establish a more extensive IP 
system. Any form of TRIPS-Plus should not contravene 
the TRIPS Agreement. Setting minimum standards for 
IP is sufficient to realize extensive IP. Thus, TRIPS-Plus, 
which is higher than the TRIPS Agreement, is allowed 
to take effect without restrictions and without risk of 
being contrary to the former agreement. However, 
this opinion deserves a thorough discussion. Article 
1.1 in the TRIPS Agreement requires the national law 
to respect the minimum protection standard in the 
Agreement, which delineates the scope of obligations 
that a country should bear under the framework of 
the Agreement. Moreover, TRIPS-Plus contains 
coercive provisions on IP protection. If TRIPS-Plus is 
acquiesced to satisfy the minimum protection standard 
under the TRIPS Agreement, the scope of obligations 
that should be fulfilled by a country under the TRIPS 
Agreement will be broadened contrary to the purpose 
of the Agreement. Thus, the minimum protection 
standard under the TRIPS Agreement should not be 
considered unlimited. A ceiling on the scope of IP 
must be set.
B. Is TRIPS-Plus in conflict with the “Minimum 
Protection Standard” under the TRIPS agreement?
In the mid-1990s, the context for reaching the 
agreement on the protocols for international IP shifted 
from WIPO and WTO to free trade agreements 
(FTAs). Its relationship with the IP clauses presents a 
14  CHINA. Measures affecting the protection and enforcement 
of  intellectual property rights: WT/DS362/R. Report of  the Panel, 
115, 116, 2009.
new feature, namely, the extension of TRIPS-Plus with 
FTAs as the major carrier. After the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement, the international IP system 
featured the co-existence of several international IP 
protocols by the TRIPS Agreement and WIPO under 
a multilateral trading system. In addition, the existing 
non-discriminatory global trade system and the “most 
favored nation” treatment principle became the pillars 
of the WTO. Article 24 of GATT and Article 5 of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
permit FTAs with a preferential nature because 
developed countries that have entered the WTO 
want developing countries to raise the level of IP to 
maintain their dominance in the technology trade. 
The extensive existence of TRIPS-Plus combined 
with the insufficient number of the “most favored 
nation” treatment principle and national treatment 
clauses under the TRIPS Agreement has conflated 
the desire of developed countries to raise IP standards 
in the international norm. Accordingly, the flexible 
clauses and policy space under the TRIPS Agreement 
are nullified by the obligations in TRIPS-Plus. Thus, 
disputes arise over the excessive restriction on national 
sovereignty, particularly in the fields of climate change, 
public health, and knowledge acquisition.15
The clauses of TRIPS Agreement do not emphasize 
“contravene.” Article 31.1 of VCLT states that “a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement focuses 
on the balance of interest between the innovator and 
user, and Article 8 is mainly about public interest in 
important fields that can benefit the above judgment. 
Moreover, the declaration of the Doha round of the 
TRIPS Agreement and public health was passed in 
2001. This declaration represents the consensus of 
WTO members in this field: “in applying the customary 
rules of the interpretation of public international 
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall 
be read in the light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives 
and principles.” This declaration can be included in the 
“other factors” considered in interpreting the context 
under Article 31.3 (a) of VCLT. Articles 7 and 8 of 
15  MUSUNGU, S. F.; DUTFIELD, G. Multilateral agreements and 
a TRIPS AGREEMENT-plus world: the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). 26. Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) 
28, 2003.
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the TRIPS Agreement indicate that the provision in 
TRIPS-Plus under FTAs that allows the raising of the 
standards for the protection of IP by a single party is 
a violation of the essence of the minimum protection 
standard under the TRIPS Agreement. The former is 
only favorable to the protection of the interests of the 
innovator or right holder and ignores the interests of 
the user; it also blocks the realization of public interests, 
such as those in the environment and health.
The word “contravene” is explained as a type of 
“conflict with a right, principle, etc.” in the Oxford 
dictionary.16 Pursuant to this definition, TRIPS-Plus 
and the TRIPS Agreement are in conflict with each 
other in terms of rights and principle. The question is, 
what is the “conflict” between norms? In the strictest 
sense, only direct incompatibility, that is, observing a 
necessary rule at the expense of other principles that 
constitutes a threat, can be regarded as true conflict. 
The Appellate Body of the WTO defines “conflict” 
in Guatemala — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey 
Portland Cement from Mexico as a situation where adherence 
to the one provision leads to the violation of another.17 
However, this opinion is not only about conflicting 
norms. The generalized understanding is that conflict 
also exists when the right to free choice provided by the 
protocol cannot be fulfilled because of the restriction 
and impediment imposed by other obligations in 
the protocol. 18 Therefore, if TRIPS Agreement-Plus 
restricts the freedom of WTO members to implement 
the flexible clauses of the TRIPS Agreement, then 
it should be regarded as conflicting with the TRIPS 
Agreement.
C. How did the panel of DSB interpret “Minimum 
Protection Standard”?
In the WTO system, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) provides guarantee and predictability to the 
implementation of a multilateral trading system. To 
clarify the articles of the agreement, DSB provides a 
common, conventional interpretation as applied to 
national laws. Under DSB, the TRIPS Agreement 
16 <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/contravene?q=contravene>.
17  The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the panel report on 
Guatemala: definitive anti-dumping measures on grey Portland 
cement from Mexico, 65 WT/DS156/R, 2000.
18  RAMANUJAN, Adarsh. Conflicts over “conflict”: 
preventing fragmentation of  international law. 1(1) 171 Trade L. & 
Dev. 191, 2009.
is by far the most extensive multilateral agreement 
concerning IP. It is subject to the following constraints: 
jurisdiction imposed by the appealing body, restrictive 
agreement of the DSB, and execution of a series of 
vindictive measures against non-compliance.
The cases related to the clauses of the TRIPS 
Agreement in DSB have given rise to many interpretations 
in the panel report where the “three-step test” was 
employed.19 The cases related to exceptional terms and 
restrictive clauses are the most remarkable. For instance, 
the panel utilized the three-step test in in Canada — 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products to determine 
whether the exceptional clauses for patents apply. They 
dismantled the original clause into three independent 
conditions. Article 30 establishes three conditions, 
which can only be applied in combination. However, 
each condition is independent from one another and 
should be met. The requirements in Article 30 are not 
fulfilled when one condition is unmet. The conclusion 
obtained is that the clause favors the economic interests 
of the right holder. In fact, the “limited exception” in 
Article 30 is not altogether separable from the other two 
conditions. Nevertheless, the separation of the three 
conditions for the purpose of analysis is not entirely 
impossible. However, such separation is difficult to 
be implemented in practice. Article 30 provides the 
major international law basis for exceptional clauses for 
patents in international trade. Its purpose is to restrict 
the additional provisions imposed by WTO members 
on the exceptional clauses for patents. As indicated in 
the report by the panel, an attempt is made to dismantle 
Article 30 through the “three-step test.” The steps are 
then performed one by one. Given that the condition 
of limited exception in the first step is found to be in 
conflict from the beginning, the panel directly concluded 
that the clause fails to fulfill the original intention and 
favors the right holder.
Thus, the TRIPS Agreement fails to provide an 
explicit provision on security and predictability related 
to whether it agrees with domestic exceptional clauses 
for IP. The reports by the panel only maintain the 
economic interests of the right holder through the 
“three-step test.” WTO members are not well informed 
19  WT/DS114/R. Panel report, Canada – Patent Protection 
of  Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Patents), 03/17/2000; 
WT/DS160/R. Panel Report, United States – Section 110 (5) of  
US Copyright Act (US – copyright), 06/15/2000; WT/DS/174R. 
Panel report, European Communities–Geographical Indications, 
03/15/2005.
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on what to do but on what should not be done under a 
general context. These non-restrictive clauses assign a 
secondary place to the interests of the users. The only 
result is that TRIPS-Plus is an unlimited extension of 
IP at the expense of public interest. The ambiguity of 
the clauses and the requirement for the approval of the 
panel reduce the probability of a country to revise the 
new exceptional clauses according to the development 
level of the domestic economy, culture, and technology. 
This task is not difficult for developed countries that 
have a long history of establishing exceptional rights. 
This issue poses a real challenge for developing and 
least-developed countries where IP protection and 
enforcement have relatively low intensity. The situation 
is aggravated by the lack of counterbalancing by the 
competition law. The ambiguity of the clauses restricts 
developing and least-developed countries from 
adopting measures in the light of their needs.20
The minimum protection standard in the IP system 
does not necessarily mean the absence of an upper 
bound constraint. However, the assumption that the 
minimum protection standard is not equipped with an 
upper limit has long prevailed because of the absence 
of an explicit regulation on upper limit. It also gave 
rise to that check and balance and protection of the 
interests and rights of users in the international IP 
system are almost non-existent. Developed countries 
that possess an advantage in technology can actively 
push TRIPS-Plus forward to raise the standard for IP 
protection and increase the scope of protection. The 
room for free choice left by the TRIPS Agreement 
to developing countries is considerably compressed. 
In this situation, developing countries are unable to 
achieve the expected goal of improving social welfare 
and are severely restricted by developed countries in 
terms of technology innovation and transfer. Although 
no dispute has existed so far in direct relation to climate-
friendly technology transfer owing to the flexible use of 
IP articles under WTO, we can obtain a general idea 
of the judgment by the expert panel from the case of 
a Canadian patented drug. However, this judgment 
remains unpredictable and gives rise to uncertainty 
in formulating policies related to climate-friendly 
technology transfer. Currently, some FTAs contain 
20  KUR, A.; RUSE–KHAN, H. Grosse. Enough is enough: the 
notion of  binding ceilings in international intellectual property 
protection, intellectual property in a fair world trade system: 
proposals for reform of  TRIPS, 359. Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 363, 2008.
special clauses on promoting technology transfer for 
the purpose of tackling climate change. In particular, 
FTAs have clauses for promoting the development 
of clean energy technology, which is closely related 
to mitigating climate change. 21 The negotiations on 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership implement a high global 
standard for IP protection in terms of labor use and 
the environment.22 Thus, the use of flexible clauses 
in IP by developing countries to acquire climate-
friendly technologies will be further restricted. Based 
on the assumption of the minimum protection 
standards in the TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.1 only 
provides a general provision on the three conditions 
for patent application and allows for discretion by the 
country. Such freedom can give rise to many rubbish 
patents or the patent thicket phenomenon for one 
specific patent.23 Developed countries usually draw 
on this clause to formulate low conditions for patent 
application to consolidate their technical dominance. 
If developing countries adopt similar conditions, the 
only consequence is that the number of patents filed 
in developed countries worldwide will increase given 
the technical dominance of these countries. Therefore, 
the entire patent system is monopolized by developed 
countries. Reflecting on the hazards brought about 
by the minimum protection standard, parties from 
developing countries in UNFCCC propose drawing 
on the flexibility clauses of the TRIPS Agreement to 
refine the provisions. However, WTO is yet to respond 
to these suggestions. As indicated in the discussion 
above, the efforts of developing countries to draw 
on the flexible clauses of the TRIPS Agreement face 
the huge risk of being crowded out by TRIPS-Plus. 
With respect to the issue of combating climate change 
and facilitating technology transfer, breaking the 
unreasonable assumption of the “minimum protection 
standards” for the international IP system will solve 
21  BREWER, T. L. Climate change technology transfer: a new 
paradigm and policy agenda. 516. Climate Policy, 526, 2008.
22  USTR said the FTA can be more integrated into the global 
trade in intellectual property standards. Intellectual Property 
Protection in China. Available at: <http://www.ipr.gov.cn/
guojiiprarticle/guojiipr/guobiehj/gbhjnews/201311/1782549_1.
html 2014-5-21>.
23 CORREA, C. M. Innovation and technology transfer of  
environmentally sound technologies: the need to engage in a 
substantive debate. 54. Review of  European Community & International 
Environmental Law, 61, 2013.
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the dilemma associated with the transfer of climate-
friendly technologies.
4 China’s practice and patent laws
The IP system is the main legal regulation that 
balances the interests of the transferor of climate-
friendly technology and that of the transferee. The 
setting of the standard for IP protection reflects the 
value orientation in balancing the interests. The general 
belief in the past was that the IP system only specifies 
the minimum protection standard but imposes no 
upper limit constraint. Such misinterpretation favors 
the protection of the interests of the transferor at the 
expense of the interests of the transferee. As the largest 
developing country, China suffers from serious climatic 
disasters induced by global warming. China is currently 
undergoing rapid economic growth. With its huge 
population base and coal-dominated energy structure, 
China’s greenhouse gas emissions will maintain 
an increasing trend for some time in the future. 
China’s climate-friendly technology has developed 
rapidly in recent years owing to the optimization of 
the international environment and domestic policy 
support. China has reached a certain industrial scale 
in biomass, solar, and wind energy as well as in other 
technical fields. The climate-friendly technology 
industry in China is now booming. However, the 
application of climate-friendly technology in China is 
still in its infancy and is significantly different from 
that in Japan, the United States, Europe, and other 
developed countries and regions. Statistics show that 
among 110,000 patent applications for low-carbon 
technology for carbon capture and storage, 25% are 
from Japan, 20% are from the United States, and only 
5% are from China.24 China possesses a large number 
of climate-friendly technology patents; however, the 
quality of these patents lags behind that in developed 
countries. China Human Development Report 2009/10: 
China and a Sustainable Future Towards a Low Carbon 
Economy & Society point out that to achieve green 
development goals in the future, China requires the 
support of least 60 core technologies, most of which 
have not been mastered by China.25 Similar to other 
24  GAO Yongyi; CHEN Kenan; SHENG Anquan. International 
patent analysis of  low-carbon technologies. 44. Science Focus, 50, 2011.
25  UNDP. China, Remin University of  China. China human 
development report. 2009/10: China and a sustainable future: towards a 
low carbon economy and society, 46 (Zou Ji. Z.J, China. Translation 
and Publishing Corporation Beijing Gretchen Luchsinger, 2009.
developing countries, China is a net importer of IP in 
the field of climate-friendly technology (particularly 
core technology). This condition reveals the low 
capacity of Chinese enterprises to research and develop 
low-carbon technology. 
Since the negotiation on international climate, the 
legislation of patent protection in China has begun 
to comply with international standards and gradually 
reflects commitments to green development and 
environmental protection. This condition will provide a 
legal foundation for promoting the internationalization 
of China’s climate-friendly technology patent protection 
and enhancement of industrial competitiveness. In 
recent years, climate-friendly technology has been 
guided by national macro-policies. The Outline of the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development released in 2011 established the 
policy orientation of promoting green and low-carbon 
development and expressly set out the objectives and 
tasks of addressing climate change. China issued the 
Twelfth Five-Year National Strategic Emerging Industry 
Development Planning in 2012. The development of 
climate-friendly technologies has been included. In 
the same year, China also issued the Special National 
Science and Technology Development Scheme to 
Handle Climate Change during the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(hereafter referred to as the Scheme); it emphasizes the 
reform of the economic growth pattern, the promotion 
of climate-friendly technology transfer, and the 
improvement of the IP strategy. The Scheme required a 
change in the existing unreasonable policy to improve 
the IP policy for advising and supporting Chinese 
businesses on low-carbon technology IP issues. The 
goals of the Promotion Plan for the Implementation of 
the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2014 are 
to increase the pertinence and efficiency of IP creation, 
strengthen the connection between IP policies and 
industrial/regional policies, and promote IP in strategic 
emerging industries.
However, serious problems continue to exist in the 
current legal system for climate-friendly technology 
protection in China. Compared with the legislation 
in developed countries, the laws and regulations 
relating to climate-friendly technology patent and 
environmental protection in China are far from perfect. 
Laws and regulations that encourage the development 
of climate-friendly technology patent have not been 
established yet. The lag in legislative work seriously 
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restricts the development of the climate-friendly 
technology industry. Considering that development 
based on climate-friendly technology patent is a 
new economic model, the traditional patent system 
still has many defects that limit the development of 
climate-friendly technology. Although China has 
established and repeatedly revised the Patent Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereafter referred 
to as the Patent Law), no content in the Patent Law 
targets the development of climate-friendly technology 
in the aspects of patent application, examination, 
licensing, protection, and use. No complete and clear 
definition of climate-friendly technology patent has 
been established. Moreover, no complete system or 
practical provision has been established to address 
climate change. For example, Article 22 in the Patent 
Law indicates that
Any invention or utility model for which patent right 
may be granted must possess novelty, inventiveness, 
and practical app1icability.
The article does not provide explicit environmental 
standards for patent application and cannot be utilized 
to effectively control and prevent non-climate-friendly 
technology from entering the field of green patents.
In addition, the Guidelines for Patent Examination 
(2010) in China provide several special requirements 
for patent licensing of climate-friendly technology. In 
its part II titled “Substantive Examination” (Chapter 
4, Article 3.2.2), it regulates the “assessment of the 
notable progress” as follows: 
When evaluating whether or not an invention 
represents notable progress, the examiner shall primarily 
consider whether or not the invention produces 
advantageous technical effects. Usually, an invention 
shall be regarded as producing advantageous technical 
effects and therefore representing notable progress 
in any of the following circumstances: (1) where, as 
compared with the prior art, the invention produces a 
better technical effect, such as quality improved, output 
increased, energy saving, and environmental pollution 
prevented or controlled.26
In its part II (Chapter 1, Article 3.1.3), the 
definition of “inventions/creations detrimental to 
public interest” is
26  State Intellectual Property Office of  the People’s Republic of  
China. Guidelines for patent examination 2010. 200. Intellectual Property 
Publishing House, 2010.
The expression “detrimental to public interest” 
means that the exploitation or use of an invention–
creation may cause detriment to the public or the 
society or may disrupt the normal order of the State 
and the society. Where the exploitation or use of an 
invention–creation may seriously waste energy or 
resources, disrupt ecological balance, or impair the 
health of the public, the invention–creation shall not 
be granted a patent right.27
Combining the two articles is in line with the goal 
of granting patents to technologies that combat climate 
change. However, in several recent revisions of the 
current patent law in China, the impact of and demand 
for low-carbon development were not specifically 
considered. Furthermore, promoting climate change 
was not directly included in the amendment scope 
of the patent law. The Patent Law and Patent Rules 
for Implementation of China currently have no clear 
patentability criteria to prevent high-carbon technology 
from obtaining patents.
Currently, China is not under direct pressure 
from the high protection standard in TRIPS-Plus.28 
However, the raising of the protection standard 
has already resulted in the incompatibility between 
domestic climate-friendly technology innovation and 
actual demand for technology import. Investigations 
on China’s renewable technology innovation and 
importation shows that the following problems usually 
exist in the practice of climate-friendly technology 
transfer to China: low level of public disclosure of patent 
information, long-term patent protection, large scope 
of patent protection that even extends into generic 
technologies, the patent holder monopolizing pricing, 
and restricting the ownership of rights associated 
with secondary inventions under the patent transfer 
contract. This situation indicates that balance in the IP 
system should be put into the schedule; otherwise, the 
dissemination of technological innovation would be 
affected. To balance the interests of the inventor and 
that of the public, specific reform measures should be 
resorted to. When it comes to formulating a reform 
plan, one issue to be clarified is the position of interests 
in the IP system. Breaking the traditional assumption 
27  Id. at 131,132.
28  The United States and the European Union have not yet 
signed an agreement with China. Thus, the Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) in which China is involved do not have problems related to 
the articles of  TRIPS-Plus. However, China is likely to face pressure 
under the articles of  TRIPS-Plus in contracting on FTAs later.
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would free us from the fixed pattern of thinking. Thus, 
we can focus more on urgent and most commonly 
shared interests and refrain from short-term egoism 
that prevents us from considering the fundamental 
interests of the development of human society.
China must promote the extensive application 
of climate-friendly technology, either introduced or 
developed independently, to curb the increasing trend 
of greenhouse gas emissions and reduce climate-related 
loss. For this purpose, a reflection on the Patent Law 
with respect to the starting point of system design is 
necessary to better serve the needs of climate-friendly 
technology development. On this basis, discarding the 
assumption of no upper limit constraint in protection 
standards and specifying a specific upper limit 
constraint will facilitate the introduction of foreign 
climate-friendly technology and the improvement of 
domestic and international legal environment with 
regard to IP. The main goal is to consolidate existing 
flexible articles on IP through restrictive regulations 
on the inside and on the outside. Hence, relevant laws 
will play a positive role in promoting the transfer of 
climate-friendly technology to developing countries. 
The IP system should properly balance the interests of 
the transferor and that of the transferee.
5 Suggestions to Improve the Standards for IP 
Protection
Patent legislation for the development of 
climate-friendly technology is determined by how 
the interaction between the patent system and 
the development of climate-friendly technology is 
considered. Climate-friendly technology development 
and innovation differ from that of traditional industrial 
technology in terms of origin. The former is grounded 
in the context of increasingly intensified environmental 
problems, whereas the latter stems from the pursuit of 
material life. Climate-friendly technology development 
is the optimization or renunciation of traditional 
technology. The modern patent system, aiming 
to fulfill the needs of climate-friendly technology 
development and dissemination, should start from 
the basic assumption about the values in adjusting this 
system. In this manner, the improved patent system 
will have an inherent mechanism that caters to the 
needs of low-carbon development and the fight against 
environmental problems. In response to climate change, 
encouraging climate-friendly technology innovation 
and dissemination should be the top priority in policy 
adjustment for patent systems both domestically and 
internationally.
Legal analysis of the “minimum protection 
standard” shows that the assumption that the 
international IP system only has “minimum standards 
of protection” does not hold. To popularize climate-
friendly technologies and avoid the negative impact 
of raising the standards of IP protection by countries 
that have technological advantages, the inherent 
assumption that international IP protection only has 
“minimum standards” needs to be revoked. An upper 
limit should be set for the standard of protection on 
the international level and in national legislation. IP 
protection standards and related systems should be 
repositioned and improved.
The patent law for climate-friendly technology 
should not be adjusted following a traditional set 
of values but should simultaneously facilitate the 
protection of rights under the framework of patent 
law and climate-friendly technology innovation. 
Traditional values center on rights protection. In this 
case, the establishment of a patent law system and the 
balance in system design based on the consideration 
of social interests are no more than the check and 
balance of rights, whereas the consideration of public 
interests is placed in the center in the patent law that 
serves climate-friendly technology development. No 
hypothesis exists for minimum protection standards. 
The patent law formulated in this manner has an 
independent value and achieves balance between 
motivation for technology innovation and technology 
dissemination.
A. International level
To promote climate-friendly technology innovation 
and transfer, the exclusiveness of IP right as a private 
right must be balanced by the consideration of interests 
in the public domain. Therefore, an upper limit on the 
standard for IP protection should be set. Through this 
means, IP abuse can be prevented, and the interests 
of people other than the right owner will be protected 
(including the right of users, the right of free trade, and 
public interests).
First of all, the TRIPS Agreement should clarify the 
general provision that the public interest mentioned in 
this protocol includes combating climate change. The 
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innovation, transfer, and spread of climate-friendly 
technologies should be incorporated into the general 
provision and public interest clause to legally support 
the unified international law related to the transfer of 
climate-friendly technologies in combating climate 
change. Doing so will also clarify the connection with 
GATT XX. The articles for promoting climate-friendly 
technology innovation, transfer, and dissemination 
should be incorporated into the general article and 
articles of public interests (Trips Agreement, Articles 
7 and 8).
Second, a ceiling should be specified in Article 1.1. 
Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement directly defines 
the minimum standards of IP protection. The first 
sentence indicates that IP protection in this Agreement 
is only required to comply with all the articles of this 
Agreement. The countries have no obligation to fulfill 
higher IP protection. However, it also affirms that all 
countries can carry out appropriate means allowed 
by the Agreement in accordance with their own 
circumstances, which suggests that all countries can 
handle issues flexibly. Flexibility may cause polarization. 
On the one hand, countries are provided autonomy to 
establish and obey protection standards that go beyond 
this Agreement. On the other hand, countries are 
provided autonomy, but no constraint is set in raising 
the standards of IP protection. The statement “as long 
as the protection does not contravene the articles of 
this Agreement” appears to be a restrictive provision 
and makes the content more ambiguous. Therefore, a 
clarification of this clause is necessary to set an upper 
limit for IP. Standards for IP protection laid down by 
nations that are above the present protocol cannot 
contravene the exceptional provisions set to serve the 
public’s interests, such as combating climate change. 
IP protection standards formulated by national IP 
laws should meet the ceiling requirements. When the 
exclusive rights to IP are in conflict with the public’s 
interests, priority should be explicitly given to the latter.
Lastly, the ceiling cannot be set by merely adjusting 
the clauses of the TRIPS Agreement. The assumption 
that IP protection standards provide only the baseline 
should be changed; however, this process takes time and 
not only involves the revision of the TRIPS Agreement 
by legislators but also the formulation of measures to 
impose the restriction on the ceiling through other 
means. Thus, the high standards laid down by TRIPS-
Plus also need to have a ceiling. The attitude of the 
DSB panel toward the standards for IP protection also 
needs to be changed. A preventive review mechanism 
for the transfer of climate-friendly technologies should 
be established as follows. First, a review mechanism 
should be set for TRIPS-Plus clauses under FTAs. 
According to the hypothesis of “minimum protection,” 
the TRIPS Agreement does not place an upper limit 
on TRIPS-Plus’ capability to raise the standards of 
IP protection among regions. However, the WTO 
has never reviewed the articles of TRIPS-Plus in the 
regional trade agreement. Although it was proposed 
to set an obligatory review mechanism for technology 
transfer in Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 
2003, the mechanism mainly targeted least-developed 
countries as mentioned in Article 66.1 in the TRIPS 
Agreement. In fact, such bilateral or regional trade 
agreements are often reviewed without allowing for 
the democratic input or a comprehensive assessment 
by the stakeholders. All of these participations should 
have preceded the formulation and revision of the 
Agreement. To protect climate-friendly technology, it 
was proposed in the WTO multilateral negotiations 
to establish a review mechanism for the terms of IP 
rights in bilateral or regional trade under the TRIPS 
Agreement. The focus is to assess the potential impact 
of climate-friendly technology transfer to developing 
countries under the articles of TRIPS-Plus. Second, 
in future dispute resolutions in DSB, independent 
assessment suggestions on whether any negative 
impact exists to promote climate-friendly technology 
development and transfer should be encouraged by 
environmental experts or NGOs, as friends of the court, 
for reference to the DSB panel. The main objective 
and measurement criteria are to determine whether the 
current interpretation of the environmental provisions 
is beneficial to the subsequent interpretation or at least 
provides an exact assessment of what can and should 
not be done. To increase predication auditing, if related 
cases occur in the future, it can play an important role 
in at least two aspects: (1) increasing the new legitimacy 
bases of the judgment and (2) the opinions of the 
existing panels may pass through the audit but are still 
biased or are apparently adverse to the interests of one 
party. At the least, a mechanism that can continue to 
improve clarity and predictability without making the 
problem worse should be established.
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B. National level
The hindrance to climate-friendly technology 
transfer brought about by the patent system is related 
to domestic patent protection in various countries. 
To fundamentally solve the conflict between climate-
friendly technology transfer and patent protection, 
cooperation and functioning of domestic legislations 
are necessary. The effective implementation of 
international low-carbon development measures under 
the domestic framework of policies and legislations 
will in turn strengthens the confidence of the 
international society in climate-friendly technology 
development. This is a virtuous circle for global 
climate governance. Therefore, the adaptation ability 
of domestic policies should be considered in designing 
a plan for coordinating international conventions. 
Protecting IP rights of climate-friendly technology by 
passing laws can contribute to the development and 
dissemination of climate-friendly technology and will 
ultimately enhance China’s industrial competitiveness. 
This is the only means for China to develop climate-
friendly technology under the influence of global 
integration. From the domestic point of view, the 
values of the related IP protection system, on the one 
hand, should be consistent with the commitments to 
the protection of IP rights as China enters WTO; on 
the other hand, they should not blindly follow the high 
standards of IP protection. China should improve the 
domestic environment of the IP system to ensure the 
independent innovation of climate-friendly technology 
and the introduction of advanced technology from 
other countries. Specifically, the Patent Law in China 
directly relating to the transfer of climate-friendly 
technology provides the following recommendations.
First, the patent system should reflect the urgent 
demand in the fight against climate change. To 
control climate change and enhance China’s ability to 
introduce and develop climate-friendly technologies, 
China’s patent legislation should incorporate the ideas 
of sustainable development, environmental protection, 
and climate change response into the scope of public 
interests. Thus, support can be provided in terms of basic 
principles and values for incorporating the regulations 
on the transfer of climate-friendly technologies into the 
flexible term reserved for the benefit of public interests.
Second, the setting of an upper limit on the 
standards for IP protection does not exclude raising 
the minimum standard for IP protection. The purpose 
of limit setting is to safeguard the policy space of 
flexible terms that all countries can utilize for the 
sake of public interests. If countries can use flexible 
terms according to their respective actual situations to 
promote technological innovation and dissemination, it 
will conform to the intended goal of setting the upper 
limit for the standards of IP protection. Article 27.1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement leaves room for discretion on 
patents granted in each country. Given that the issue of 
climate change response has not been included in the 
amendment scope of patent law, China’s Patent Law and 
Patent Rules for Implementation currently have no clear 
patentability criteria to prevent high-carbon technology 
from obtaining patents. As a result, many high-
carbon technologies have acquired patent protection. 
Backward production capacity and technologies that 
should be eliminated have been legitimized. Assertion 
must be made that in determining the creativity and 
practicality of an invention, an invention shall not be 
patentable on any account if it does not comply with 
the environmental protection criteria provided by the 
Patent Law. Another proposal is to introduce “climate-
friendliness” requirements into the Patent Law and the 
Patent Law Rules for Implementation as one of the 
criteria to assess patentability. Thus, China’s Patent Law 
would mainly protect technologies that are higher in 
quality, more advanced, and more helpful in addressing 
climate change. Furthermore, it would prevent the 
phenomenon of “patent thickets” in the development 
of climate-friendly technologies. 
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, setting a ceiling for the IP system 
is necessary but is not equivalent to denying that 
protection above the minimum protection level is 
unreasonable. Nevertheless, the prerequisite, at the 
least, is that the public interest of combating climate 
change can be realized with priority under the flexible 
clauses for IP protection. The setting of the ceiling 
remains risky. Thus, one-size-fits-all provisions 
should be avoided in international institutions. 
Advanced legislative techniques should be employed 
at both international and national scales. A systematic 
arrangement is required in terms of institutional value 
and content. The international controversy that “the 
IP system impedes the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies” triggers a more thorough reflection on 
the international IP system. The presumption that 
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the international IP system only provides minimum 
protection standards should be eliminated. Doing so 
is beneficial for establishing a more reasonable legal 
system for the transfer of climate-friendly technologies. 
Future studies should focus on whether international 
and national legislations, including the IP system, 
facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly technologies to 
developing countries. Another issue is how to establish 
and improve legislations for this purpose. The IP system 
is currently undergoing dynamic development, and 
the balance of interests involved in it also needs to be 
viewed from a dynamic perspective. The key to striking 
balance in the field of climate-friendly technology is 
to determine the baseline of the new balance. In the 
context of the common environmental problem for the 
entire human race, this baseline is different from that 
intended to motivate innovation. As one of the goals 
of the establishment of an IP system, climate-friendly 
technology should be given the highest priority in the 
fight against climate change.
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